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The notion of Net Present Value (NPV) is thought to formally translate the notion of
economic prot, where the discount rate is the cost of capital. The latter is the expected
rate of return of an equivalent-risk alternative that the investor might undertake and is often
found by making recourse to the Capital Asset Pricing Model. This paper shows that the
notions of disequilibrium NPV and economic prot are not equivalent: NPV-minded agents
are open to framing eects and to arbitrage losses, which imply violations of Modigliani and
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the CAPM by several authors and widely used in applied corporate nance, should therefore
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1 Introduction
Economic prot on one side, (net) present value on the other side. The former is one of the
building blocks of economic theory, the latter is a cornerstone in nancial economics.
Economic prot is a fundamental notion in economic theory since Marshall (1890). It repre-
sents the \excess prot that is gained from an investment over and above the prot that could
be obtained from the best alternative foregone" (Rao, 1992, p. 87). That is, economic prot
from an investment is the dierence between prot from that investment and prot from the
best alternative foregone. In other terms, the alternative foregone's prot acts as an opportunity
cost (see Buchanan, 1969). As known, many synonyms have been coined to mean `economic
prot': `excess prot' (Preinreich, 1938), `excess realizable prot' (Edwards and Bell, 1961),
`excess income' (Peasnell, 1982), `abnormal earnings' (Ohlson, 1995), `supernormal prot' (see
Begg, Fischer, and Dornbusch, 1984, p. 121), `residual income' (Solomons, 1965; Biddle, Bowen,
and Wallace, 1999; Martin, Petty and Rich, 2003). The concept of `Goodwill' (e.g., Preinreich,
1936) is also strictly related to that of excess prot. Other names are Economic Value Added,
Cash Value Added, Created Shareholder Value (see Fern andez, 2002).1.
1See Magni, 2000a, 2000b, 2003, 2005, 2007c for a nonclassical way of formalizing economic prot.
2Net Present Value (NPV) is a fundamental notion in nance since Fisher (1930), although
\the technology of discounting is not an invention of twentieth century" (Miller and Napier, 1993,
p. 640): Discounted-cash-ow analysis was known and (sometimes) employed since eighteenth
century (Brackenborough, McLean and Oldroyd, 2001. See also Parker, 1968; Edwards and
Warman, 1981). As known, the NPV is a function of the discount rate, and the latter is
often found by making use of the classical Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964;
Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966), which puts into eect the NPV methodology.
The notions of economic prot and NPV are often viewed as two sides of the same medal:
The NPV is just economic prot disguised in present terms. The common idea of economic
prot maximization is then equivalent to the idea of net present value maximization: \The rm
attempts to maximize the present value of its net cash ow over an innite horizon" (Abel, 1990,
p. 755) and \the net present value rule is also the basis for the neoclassical theory of investment"
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 5).
Decision making is straightforward with such equivalent notions. Rubinstein (1973) shows
that if the CAPM assumptions are met, a project is worth undertaking if its expected rate of
return is greater than the disequilibrium required rate of return. His maximization rule is as
follows:
The rm should accept the project with the highest excess expected internal rate of
return weighted by its cost (p. 174)
This result ... is equivalent to accepting the project with the highest net present
value (ibidem, footnote 14).
The rst quotation just focusses on maximization of economic prot, the second one suggests
to maximize net present value. Magni (2008) shows that the use of disequilibrium values is
standard in corporate nance and is widespread in academic papers as well as in textbooks.
This paper shows that, contrary to what Rubinstein seems to imply, the alleged equivalence
of (disequilibrium) NPV and economic prot does not hold. Such a NPV does not represent
economic prot and, in addition, it is a biased measure because it is nonadditive; the same holds
for the notion of disequilibrium value.2 In particular, decision makers abiding by the standard
NPV+CAPM methodology give inconsistent answers to the same problem dierently framed.
In other terms, they are trapped in a sort of mental accounting (Thaler, 1985, 1999) so that
their evaluations dier depending on whether outcomes are seen as aggregate or disaggregate
2Problems in the equilibrium NPV may be found as well (see Magni, 2007a, 2008).
3quantities. This amounts to saying that their valuations and choice behaviors do not comply with
the principle of description invariance, which prescribes that valuations and decisions must be
invariant under changes in description of the same asset. Violations of this principle are known
as framing eects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Soman, 2004).
This bias bears signicant relations to the violation of the principle of arbitrage, which is a well-
established principle of economic rationality implying that rational decision makers do not incur
arbitrage losses (see Nau and McCardle, 1991; Nau, 1999). In the eld of corporate valuation
this violation reduces to an infringement of the classical Modigliani and Miller's Proposition I.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 it is shown that NPV and economic prot
bear a strong formal relation in that the former is the present value of the latter. Section 3
shows an example highlighting the fact that NPV does not represent economic prot, is not
additive and does not fulll the principle of description invariance (i.e. implies framing eects).
In contrast, economic prot is additive and frame-independent. Section 4 shows the same results
in more formal terms. In section 5 it is shown, on the basis of the previous results, that value
itself is nonadditive. Section 6 shows that NPV-minded decision makers incur arbitrage losses.
Section 7 shows that the association of CAPM and NPV does not comply with Modigliani and
Miller's Proposition I. In particular, the choice behavior of a potential NPV-minded buyer is
not invariant under changes in the rm debt-equity ratio.
2 Economic prot and NPV as companions
Let W0 be an investment cost and denote with W1 the nal payo at time 1. Consider the
prot W1   W0, which we can reformulate as rW0, with r = W1 W0
W0 being the rate of return.
Consider also an alternative business for the investor and let i be the relative rate of return.
The corresponding prot is W0(1 + i)   W0 = iW0 and represents an opportunity cost, a
foregone return. The economic (excess) prot is given by the dierence between the factual
prot the entrepreneur receives and the counterfactual prot she would receive if she invested
in the alternative business. Denoting economic prot with  we have:
 = rW0   iW0: (1)
Note that the above equation may also be stated as a dierence between two future values:
 = W1   W0(1 + i): (2)
From a nancial perspective,  is the Net Future Value. In nance, it is common to work with
present values so the notion of Net Present Value (NPV) is introduced, which is given by the
4discounted algebraic sum of all cash ows involved in the business. In our simplied one-period
case, we have
NPV =  W0 +
W1
1 + i
: (3)
Economic prot and NPV bear a strong formal relation: NPV is the present value of (1) (or,
equivalently, the present value of (2)):
NPV =

1 + i
=
1
1 + i
(rW0   iW0): (4)
In other terms, economic prot and net future value are dierent names for the same notion,
whereas net present value is the present value of economic prot. It is worthwhile noting that
eqs. (3)-(4) preserve the sign of eqs. (1)-(2) (as long as i >  1, as will be assumed here).
Decision-making implications of this formal equivalence are straightforward: A business is worth
undertaking if and only if the economic prot (the NPV) is positive.
Under uncertainty, the rates r and i are expected values and the two rates refer to alternatives
equivalent in risk, so that eqs. (1) and (3) are measures of expected excess prot (in nal and
present terms respectively). What `equivalent in risk' means depends on the model selected.
The classical and sophisticated CAPM is the most common tool for measuring an asset's risk,
which is given by its beta:
 =
cov(e r;e rm)
2
m
=
cov(f W1;rm)
W02
m
(5)
where e rm and 2
m denotes the market rate of return and its variance (a tilde on a symbol will
henceforth highlight randomness).
To calculate excess prot (and NPV) under uncertainty one just has to use the fundamental
equation of the CAPM, known as the Security Market Line (SML). Under suitable assumptions,
the latter individuates the required rate of return of the business under examination; such a
rate is the (opportunity) cost of capital, i.e. the expected rate of return of the counterfactual
alternative available to the entrepreneur. We have
i = rf + (rm   rf) (6)
where rf is the risk-free rate and rm is the expected market rate of return. Applying this security
valuation relation to capital budgeting we have a simple rule: A project should be undertaken
if and only if
r > rf + (rm   rf) (7)
5i.e. if and only if its expected rate of return exceeds the cost of capital (see Rubinstein, 1973,
p. 171) or, in terms of NPV, if and only if its risk-adjusted NPV is positive:
 W0 +
W1
1 + rf + (rm   rf)
> 0 (8)
where W1 is the expected value of f W1.
Remark 1. It is worth noting that the beta in (5) is a disequilibrium beta, so that the NPV
in (8) is a disequilibrium NPV. Beside Rubinstein (1973), the legitimacy of the disequilibrium
beta for computing the cost of capital has been deducted from the CAPM by several authors
(see Senbet and Thompson, 1978; Magni, 2007b, for a review).
3 Nonadditivity and framing eects: An example
Consider the security market described in Table 1, where a risky asset and a risk-free asset
are traded and two possible states may occur, conventionally labeled `good' and `bad', with
probability 0.8 and 0.2 respectively. The market is complete, is assumed to be in equilibrium
(all marketed assets lie on the SML) and arbitrage is not possible.3 Let us imagine an economic
agent comes across the opportunity of investing in a business A composed of two sub-projects.
The rst one, say A1; consists of an outlay of 15500 euros and generates an outcome of f W1
A,
equal to 58000 in good state and 3000 in bad state. The second one, say A2, consists in an
outow of 70000 euros and a nal risk-free inow of 72000 at time 1. Suppose also that this
two-project business is to be fully accepted or fully rejected (no sub-project may be undertaken
alone). To decide, the investor computes the NPV of the business. The rates of return of A1 are
58000=15500 1=2.7419 and 3000=15500 1= 0.8064 in good and bad state respectively; the
expected rate of return is rA1 = (2:7419)(0:8)+( 0:8064)(0:2) = 2:0322. The covariance of e rA1
with e rm is cov(e rA1;e rm) = 0:5677 and the risk is therefore A1=0.5677/0.16=3.5484. The cost
of capital is iA1=rf + A1(rm   rf) = 0:15 + 3:5484(0:45   0:15) = 1:2145. The economic prot
is then
W0
A1(rA1   iA1) = 15500(2:0322   1:2145) = 12675 (9)
while the NPV is
NPVA1 =
12675
1 + iA1
=
12675
1 + 1:2145
= 5723: (10)
3As Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) show, if (i) the CAPM pricing relation holds for all securities in the market,
(ii) the market is complete, (iii) the probability that e rm > rm +
2
m
rm rf is positive, then arbitrage opportunities
arise. But in our market of Table 1 condition (iii) is not satised.
6As for A2, its rate of return is 0.02857=72=70 1 in both states. As the project is riskless, the
cost of capital is rf = 0:15, so the excess prot is
W0
A2(rA2   rf) = 70000(0:0285   0:15) =  8500 (11)
and the NPV is
NPVA2 =
 8500
1 + rf
=
 8500
1 + 0:15
=  7391: (12)
Consider now a business B that can be undertaken with an expenditure of 85500 euros whereby
the investor will obtain f W1
B, equal to 130000 or 75000 in good and bad state respectively. The
rate of return of B is 130000=85500 1=0.5204 and 75000=85500 1= 0.1228 in good and bad
state respectively so that the expected rate of return is rB=(0:8)0:5204+(0:2)( 0:1228)=0.39181.
It is easy to see that the risk of B is B=0.6432 and the cost of capital is therefore iB =
0:15 + 0:6432(0:45   0:15)=0.34298. The excess prot is
W0
B(rB   iB) = 85500(0:39181   0:34298) = 4175 (13)
and the NPV is
NPVB =
4175
1 + iB
=
4175
1 + 0:34298
= 3108: (14)
It is worthwhile noting that the NPV of business B diers from the NPV of business A, which is
5723 7391= 1668. Yet, the two businesses represent the same course of action described in two
dierent ways, because both share the same total investment outlay (15500+75000=85500) and
the same nal outcomes in good and bad state (58000+72000=130000 and 3000+72000=75000).
We have then A1+A2=B. This is a signicant result. From a nancial perspectives, it means that
the NPV is nonadditive (because NPVA1+NPVA26=NPVA1+A2); from a cognitive and behavioral
outlook, it means that an NPV-minded economic agent incurs framing eects in decision making,
because the alternative A1 + A2 is rejected (its NPV is negative) and the logically equivalent
alternative B is accepted (its NPV is positive). By contrast, note that the economic prot as
translated in (1) gives univocal results: Economic prot from B is 4175, which coincides with
economic prot from the two-project business A (=12675   8500).
4 Nonadditivity and framing eects: A simple formalization
In general, consider an investment whose initial outlay is W0 and whose nal payo is the
random sum f W1, available at time 1. This investment may always be viewed as a portfolio
7of two investments, one risky and one risk-free, whose outlays are W0   h and h respectively
and whose outcomes are f W1   k and k respectively, with h;k 2 R. The economic prot of the
investment may be formalized as the sum of these two investments' excess prots. In order to
avoid framing eects, description invariance must be guaranteed, which means that economic
prot must be invariant under changes in h and k. Indeed, considering  and i as functions of
h and k, we have
(h;k) =
risky excess prot
z }| { 
(W1   k)   (W0   h)   i(h;k)(W0   h)

+
risk-free excess prot
z }| {
(k   h   rfh) (15)
with
i(h;k) = rf +
rm   rf
2
m
cov
f W1   k
W0   h
  1;e rm

:
Substituting the latter in (15) we obtain
(h;k) = W1   W0  

rf +
rm   rf
2
m
cov
f W1   k
W0   h
  1;e rm

(W0   h)   rfh
= W1   W0  
h
rf +
rm   rf
(W0   h)2
m
cov(f W1;e rm)
i
(W0   h)   rfh
= W1   W0(1 + rf)  
rm   rf
2
m
cov
 f W1;rm

:
It is then evident that
@(h;k)
@h =
@(h;k)
@k = 0 for all h and k, which means that economic prot
does not change whatever the way the investment is partitioned (i.e., regardless of aggregation
or disaggregation of cash ows).
As for the NPV, seen as a function of h and k, things are dierent:
NPV(h;k) =  (W0   h) +
W1   k
1 + rf +
rm rf
2
m cov(
f W1 k
W0 h   1;e rm)
+

 h +
k
1 + rf

(16)
whence
NPV(h;k) =  W0 +
W1   k
1 + rf +
rm rf
2
m
 
W0 h
 cov(f W1;e rm)
+
k
1 + rf
: (17)
It is evident that, in general,
@NPV(h;k)
@h 6= 0 as well as
@NPV(h;k)
@k 6= 0. Therefore NPV changes as
h and/or k change, and it is not true that NPV(h1;k1)=NPV(h2;k2) for all h1, h2, k1, k2, as the
principle of description invariance requires. As a particular case, the example above described
has shown that
(70000;72000) = (0;0) = 4175
8whereas
NPV(70000;72000) =  1668 6= NPV(0;0) = 3108;
in the latter case choice behavior depends on the choice of the pair (h;k), in the former case it
is irrelevant.
5 Value is nonadditive
As a consequence, the notion of value in this context is severely undermined. The value V of an
asset is given by V =NPV+W0 (where W0 is the cost to be paid by investors for undertaking it).
Referring to the numerical example above where B=A1 + A2 and bearing in mind the previous
results about NPV, we have
VA1 + VA2 = NPVA1 + W0
A1 + NPVA2 + W0
A2
= NPVA1 + NPVA2 + W0
B
6= NPVB + W0
B = VB = VA1+A2:
with obvious meaning of W0
A1, W0
A2, W0
B. Putting it dierently, value is a function of h and k:
V (h;k) = NPV(h;k) + W0 (18)
whose partial derivatives are not identically zero (see eq. (17)), and thus value is not invariant
under changes in the description of valuation process.
6 Arbitrage Losses
The nonadditivity of value and net present value is full of implications. In addition to the
framing eect above mentioned we have that our NPV-minded investor is subject to arbitrage
losses. To see why, let us refer to the example in section 3. Suppose an economic agent (whom we
can call the arbitrageur) asks the investor for a borrowing of 89000 euros whereby he will repay
the amount f W1
B after one period (the investor accepts to lend money, given that the NPV is
easily found to be 112.326). At the same time, the arbitrageur oers our investor two nancings:
A loan of 15500 whereby the investor will repay g W1
A1 and a loan of 70000 whereby the investor
will reimbursed 72000 euros at the end of the period. These nancings are to be accepted or
rejected conjunctly. Our investor evidently accepts, given that  (NPVA1+NPVA2) is positive
(=1668). As a result of this choice behavior, our NPV-minded investor receives a sure loss of
93500 euros. (Table 2 shows the NPV-minded investor's payos. Those for the arbitrageur are
the same with opposite sign).
7 Violation of Modigliani and Miller's Proposition I
Let us now focus on a world  a la Modigliani and Miller (1958) where Proposition I holds, so
that rm value is not aected by the mix equity-debt. Consider an example of two rms. Firm
U is unlevered and all the stocks are owned by entrepreneur U; rm L is levered and all the
stocks and bonds are owned by agent L.4 Let P be a potential buyer and suppose that:
 the two rms will generate the same total cash ow f W1
 agent U is ready to sell his stocks in exchange of W0 euros
 agent L is ready to sell his entire endowment in rm L selling the stocks in exchange of
W0 euros but giving free his bonds to the buyer of the rm
 the debt of rm L is risk-free
 agent P is a CAPM enthusiast and selects alternatives via NPV rule.
As a result of the above assumptions, investor P computes the value of both rms as follows.
The value of rm U is5
VU =
W1
kU
(19)
where kU = rf + U(rf   rm) is the (unlevered) cost of capital. Denoting with e rU the rate of
return for rm U's stockholders, the unlevered beta is given by
U =
cov(e rU;e rm)
2
m
: (20)
As rm U is sold at W0 and will generate payo f W1, the rate of return for the buyer is e rU =
f W1
W0   1, and (20) becomes
U =
cov(
f W1
W0   1;e rm)
2
m
=
cov(f W1;e rm)
W02
m
: (21)
4Agents U and L are therefore representative agents (for sake of simplicity) but one may equivalently consider
agents holding only some shares and bonds in a convenient ratio.
5The relations presented in this section may be interpreted in two ways: Perpetuity of constant cash ows may
be assumed, as usual, or (for coherence with the above sections) one may think of a one-period rm so that f W
1
is the nal free cash ow, the rates rf, rm, kU, ke are capitalization factors (i.e. 1 plus rate), and I represents
interest+principal repayment.
10The value of rm L is easily found. Denoting with I the cash ow to debt, the equity cash ow
is f W1   I. Bearing in mind that the cost of debt equals the risk-free rate we have
VL =
W1   I
ke
+
I
rf
(22)
where ke = rf + e(rf   rm). Denoting with e re the rate of return for rm L's stockholders, the
beta of equity is given by
e =
cov(e re;e rm)
2
m
: (23)
As equity is sold at W0, the rate of return is e re =
f W1   I
W0   1, so that (23) becomes
e =
cov(
f W1 I
W0   1;e rm)
2
m
=
cov(f W1   I;e rm)
W02
m
: (24)
But cov(f W1   I;e rm)=cov(f W1;e rm) for I is a real number. Consequently we have
e =
cov(f W1;e rm)
W02
m
= U (25)
which implies
ke = rf + e(rf   rm) = rf + U(rf   rm) = kU (26)
whence
VL =
W1   I
kU
+
I
rf
=
W1
kU
 
I
kU
+
I
rf
6=
W1
kU
= VU:
This result contradicts Modigliani and Miller's Proposition I. This just means what we already
know: Valuation is not invariant under changes in framing. In this case, we have two nancially
equivalent rms paying o the same total cash ows: viewing the latter either as an aggregate
quantity or as the sum of two quantities of dierent nature makes valuation nonequivalent.6
Analogously, choice behavior may dier. Whenever agent P nds that
NPVL = VL   W0 < 0 < VU   W0 = NPVU
then rm U is purchased and rm L is not. In the opposite case
NPVU = VU   W0 < 0 < VL   W0 = NPVL
6We have assumed that agent L gives free his holdings of bonds. This is not restrictive, as the numerical
example in section 3 shows: Assume A1's cash ow is the equity cash ow of a levered rm, A2's cash ow is
the cash ow to debt, A1 and A2's outlays are just the price at which agent L is ready to sell equity and bonds
respectively; suppose also B's cash ow is the capital cash ow of an unlevered rm and B's outlay is the price
at which agent U is ready to sell the rm. Then, the values of the two rms dier, as seen.
11it is rm L to be purchased.7 Again, this is a bias in the behavior of our NPV enthusiast.
In contrast, economic prot leads to a correct decision: Economic prot from U is
(W1   W0)   kUW0;
economic prot from L is

 
W1   I

  W0

  keW0

+

 
I   0

 
 
rf0


which are equal since ke = kU, as shown in (26).
8 Conclusions
For one-period investments under certainty, the Net Present Value (NPV) of an investment
represents economic prot. Under uncertainty, a widespread method to value an asset (and thus
to compute an NPV) is to discount cash ows with a disequilibrium cost of capital calculated via
CAPM (for the use of an equilibrium NPV see Magni, 2007a, 2008). The (disequilibrium) NPV
of an investment is formally given by the present value of excess prot (value is then computed
as the present value of excess prot plus cost). The disequilibrium NPV is validly deducted from
the CAPM, as Rubinstein (1973) shows. However this paper, focussing on such a disequilibrium
NPV shows that:
 while it is true that this NPV is calculated by discounting economic prot (and value is
found by adding cost), it does not represent economic prot
 the disequilibrium NPV is nonadditive, which also implies that the disequilibrium value is
nonadditive
 NPV-minded decision makers incur framing eects in both valuation (dierent values and
NPVs) and choice behavior (accepting and rejecting the same investment)
 NPV-minded agents are open to arbitrage losses
 the standard disequilibrium NPV+CAPM valuation procedure is not consistent with Modigliani
and Miller's Proposition I.
7Obviously, in this case agent P becomes, at the same time, stockholder and bondholder.
12Consequently, the association of disequilibrium NPV and CAPM is a awed methodology and
should not be used for project valuation and selection, given that it does not fulll the principle
of description invariance (valuation and judgment must not depend on framing) and the principle
of arbitrage (rational decision makers do not incur arbitrage losses).
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17Table 1. The security market
Security
risky risk-free Market
Outstanding shares 10 10
state probability
165 115 1,650 s1 0.8
Cash Flow
(
65 115 650 s2 0.2
65 15 65 s1 0.8
Rate of return (%)
(
 35 15  35 s2 0.2
Expected
rate of return (%)
45 15 45
Covariance with
the market rate of return
0.16 0 0.16
Beta 1 0 1
Value 100 100 1000
18Table 2. Arbitrage loss for an NPV-minded agent
Payos
Time 0 Time 1
Borrowing (= A1) 15500  f W1
A1
Borrowing (= A2) 70000  72000
Lending  89000 f W1
B
Net Payos  3500 f W1
B f W1
A1 72000=0
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